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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an overview over contemporary empathy 
research, including concepts and definitions as well as 
descriptions of empathic processes and outcomes. Based on these 
theoretical foundations, three different approaches to model 
empathy are described: a low-level computational approach, an 
OCC-based approach, and an empathy model inspired by PSI, a 
general psychological theory of psychic functioning. Ideas on how 
these models could be implemented in agents are discussed and 
preliminary efforts to evaluate the plausibility and believability 
of the empathic processes and outcomes are drafted. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.3.3 [Programming Languages]: none 
General Terms 
Theory 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the field of social and emotional learning and intercultural 
education, virtual learning environments provide users with the 
opportunity for learning in a safe environment that is inhabited 
by emotionally expressive, autonomous agents (e.g. FearNot! 
[1]). Social and emotional learning with such agents is allowed 
for through empathic reactions in the user towards the virtual 
agents on the screen, a reaction that is enforced by the emotional 
expressivity of the agents. However, the true power of social 
relations towards artificial entities (such as agents in virtual 
worlds or as robots in the real world) can only be discovered if 
we manage to provide the user or learner with companions that 
show interest in the user and react sensitively towards their 
needs and intentions, hence, that react empathically towards the 
user. 
1.1 Empathy concepts and definitions 
Empathy is defined by contemporary researchers as a construct 
that comprises two components: affective and cognitive aspects. 
While some researchers embrace both aspects in their empathy 
definitions [2,3], others emphasize either the one or the other, 
e.g. according to Hogan [4] “… empathy means the intellectual or 
imaginative apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind 
without actually experiencing that person’s feelings… ” 
(cognitive empathy), whereas Hoffman [5] posits that … empathy 
[is] a vicarious affective response to others… ” (affective 
empathy). For the present study, we want to define empathy as 
an observer’s understanding of the internal state of a target 
(cognitive empathy) as well as the observer’s emotional reaction 
to what he/she perceives as being the internal state of a target 
(affective empathy). 
Cognitive empathy means, the observer has to focus his/her 
attention on the target, reading expressive signals as well as 
situational context cues, and to try to understand – based on what 
he/she knows about emotional expressions in general, meanings 
of situations in general, and previous reactions of the target – the 
current reactions of the target. In general, for the empathic 
reaction to even start, the observer needs to be motivated and 
able to perceive and interpret correctly the expressive and 
situational cues indicating the reaction / internal state of the 
target. To be able to do this, the observer needs knowledge about 
emotional states and other reactions, how they are expressed, and 
what elicits them, and he/she needs to either know the target 
person in order to understand his/her internal state or perceive 
the target person as similar to themselves. 
Affective empathy relates to the general way of how emotions 
emerge in a person. In the case of affective empathy, the 
emotions in the observer emerge due to the (conscious or 
unconscious) perception of internal states in a target (either 
emotions or thoughts and attitudes). Affective empathy thus can 
be the result of cognitive empathy, but can also grow out of the 
perception of expressive behavior that immediately transfers 
emotional states from one individual to another (emotional 
contagion). In this case, qualitatively highly similar affective 
states are evoked in the observer, resulting from a direct link or 
transfer of emotional states between individuals through verbal, 
para-verbal and non-verbal cues. This mechanism serves the 
biological function of fostering social identity and adaptation to 
the group, e.g. when it is vital for a herd of animals to react 
quickly to a predator that is only detected by one or few members 
of the group. In case of reactive affective empathy emerging due 
to cognitive (empathic) processes, a more complex 
conglomeration of affective states (like gloating) may result as 
opposed to the highly similar emotional states that result from 
emotional contagion. 
1.2 Empathic processes and outcomes 
Another important conceptual distinction is made between 
internal processes involved in empathy and the outcomes of these 
empathic processes. According to Davis [3], empathic outcomes 
have to be distinguished from processes that are “empathy-
related, because they frequently occur during episodes in which 
an observer is exposed to a target, and because they often result 
in some empathy-related outcome” (p. 15). However, these 
processes are not specific for empathy; they occur in other 
contexts as well and can then also produce other but empathic 
outcomes. Empathic outcomes can be further divided in intra- 
and interpersonal. Referring to Hoffman’s developmental theory 
of empathy [11], Davis distinguishes between non-cognitive, 
simple cognitive, and advanced cognitive processes that can be 
involved in an empathic episode. 
Non-cognitive processes These processes rely on the direct link 
between emotional states perceived in a target and the evocation 
of according or similar emotional states in the observer as 
described above. This direct, pre-reflexive and pre-verbal link 
can be observed very early in the human development, e.g. as 
“primary circular reaction” of newborns that cry if they perceive 
the crying of other infants. Also, imitation of simple expressive 
gestures (or motor mimicry) can create an according emotional 
state (see James / Lange theory on emotion [12]) which can be 
interpreted as a rudimentary form of empathy in very small 
children. Although empathic abilities improve with the 
development of cognitive abilities in the child, motor mimicry 
can also be part of the empathic experience in later life. 
Simple cognitive processes Due to progressing cognitive 
development, more and more complex cognitive processes can 
add to the empathic experience. First, classical conditioning in a 
given situation or event allows for reinforcing affective reactions 
when the observer is simultaneously experiencing an emotion 
evoking situation (UCS) and an intense emotional expression of 
a target. The perceived emotional expression of the target can 
serve as a conditioned stimulus later (CS), thus leading to the 
activation of the emotion in the observer, even in other 
situations; e.g. a toddler on her father’s arm in an emotion-
arousing situation. Related to this process is direct association, a 
process of associating perceived expressive or situational cues of 
a target with memory representations of similar expressions or 
situations experienced earlier by the observer, eventually 
resulting in similar affective states in the target and the observer. 
During the very similar process of labelling simple 
representations about the meaning of situations or events are 
used to infer the internal state of a target experiencing this 
situation or event (e.g. a funeral implies for people to feel sad). 
Advanced cognitive processes On top of the rather simple 
associative processes described above, associations can also be 
triggered by language expressions, e.g. witnessing a target saying 
“I’ve been laid off” alone suffices to trigger an understanding 
and maybe even the associated feeling of somebody who has 
been laid off (even in the absence of nonverbal gestures; this 
mode is working when empathizing with fictional characters, e.g. 
when reading a book). Also elaborated cognitive networks are at 
work when it comes to interpreting other situational cues, apart 
from language. Both processes rely on feelings and experiences 
the observer has acquired before being faced with the language 
or situational cues that trigger empathy. The most advanced 
cognitive process involved in empathy is role-taking, “the 
attempt by one individual to understand another by imagining the 
other’s perspective” ([3] p. 17). It involves not only associations 
to own feelings or experiences collected in the past, but also the 
effortful suppression of the egocentric perspective and the 
willingness to experience the situation or event explicitly from 
the target’s perspective. Hence, it is the only process involved in 
empathy that lives up to the criterion of consciously 
distinguishing the Self from the Other and can be regarded as the 
most mature and developed empathic process. 
While the empathic processes can be interpreted as stages in the 
development of empathy, with role-taking developing latest, all 
processes can be part of an empathic experience in later life, e.g. 
processes of emotional contagion, association with memory 
representations and role-taking may all result in a complex and 
rich empathic experience within the observer. Also, the single 
processes may have an impact on each other. Even though there 
is a lack of empirical investigations into the interactions of 
different processes that contribute to an empathic episode, it is 
highly plausible to assume that more than one of them can 
operate simultaneously. Regarding the outcomes of the empathic 
processes described above, Davis distinguishes between 
intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes [3]. Interpersonal 
outcomes can be influenced by intrapersonal empathic outcomes. 
Intrapersonal outcomes Intrapersonal outcomes are changes in 
the internal state of the observer that can be either affective or 
non-affective. Affective outcomes are emotions that emerge in 
the observer, and can be either parallel or reactive in nature. 
Parallel affective outcomes produce the same or similar emotion 
as the emotion of the target, e.g. through motor mimicry, whereas 
reactive affective outcomes rely on associative and role-taking 
processes and merge with own reactions to the perceived 
situation and reaction of the target (the resulting affective states 
can be a blend of different emotions rather than an actual copy of 
the target emotion, e.g. personal distress, sympathy, or gloating). 
Non-affective outcomes are e.g. the accuracy with which the 
observer perceives the situational and expressive cues, and the 
resulting quality of the assessment of thoughts, feelings, and 
attitudes of the target [13]. According to [3] empirical evidence 
suggests that similarity and familiarity between observer and 
target play an important role in interpersonal accuracy. 
Additionally, the reasons for the target’s behavior that the 
observer attributes to the target are influenced by empathic 
processes: what has been termed actor-observer-difference 
describes the empirical finding that one usually refers to 
situational forces to explain one’s own behavior (particularly if 
the behavior is not successful) while observers tend to explain 
the behavior of others with the help of personality characteristics 
or traits [14]. Empathy influences these tendencies by resulting 
in more actor-like attributions (referring to situational forces) in 
the observer; again, similarity, familiarity, and also sympathy or 
affection for the target person are additional factors that 
influence attribution biases apart from empathy. 
Interpersonal outcomes Interpersonal outcomes of empathic 
processes relate to behavior emerging directly from the affective 
and/or cognitive empathic processes in the observer due to the 
perception of the target. The three behavioral classes described 
by [3] are helping, aggression, and social behavior. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the present work aims at 
empathy within the agent. Three different approaches to model 
affective and cognitive empathy in an agent’s mind are 
introduced: one is based on the OCC theory of emotions and its 
implementation within the agent architecture FAtiMA [6], one is 
based on PSI, a generic model of the human psychic functioning 
[7] [8], and one is a simple “if-then”-solution, inspired by 
computational approaches (this aspect of the present study 
represents original work, hence no reference can be provided). 
The three hypothetical models of empathy in agents are described 
in more detail in chapter 2. To evaluate these models of empathy, 
a text-based evaluation approach was chosen which is introduced 
in chapter 3: answers to four different moral dilemmas posed by 
readers of the weekly magazine of a German newspaper [9] have 
been rewritten according to a set of rules extracted from each of 
the three different models. The resulting expert answers to each 
of the moral dilemmas have been rated on a set of adjectives 
previously identified as measuring empathy [10]. 
2. THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO 
MODELING EMPATHY 
In this section, the three hypothetical models of empathy in 
agents are described in more detail. The first approach uses the 
OCC model of emotions [15] to model empathy. The OCC model 
has been selected because it is a commonly used model in 
computer science which considers appraisal as a subjective 
evaluation of a given event according to the character goals, 
standards and beliefs, resulting in a defined set of qualitatively 
different emotions (see fig. 1). Appraisals are influenced by 
former experiences of the organism and result in emotions that 
can refer to the outcomes of events, the agency of other agents or 
the attributes of objects. For each of them the appraisal criterion 
is different. Objects are appraised regarding their appealingness, 
agents regarding the praiseworthiness of their actions, and the 
outcomes (or consequences) of events are appraised regarding 
their desirability (see fig. 1). Desirability can be further 
distinguished regarding whether the consequences of an event 
impact the agent itself (desirability for the self) or other agents 
(desirability for others). For example, when someone wins in the 
lottery, it is desirable for them, but won’t necessarily affect 
others. Ortony et al. [15] posit that different appraisals lead to 
qualitatively different types of emotions; figure 1 outlines the 
appraisals and the resulting emotions for the appraisal of events. 
Some of these emotions can be interpreted as affective outcomes 
of empathic processes (happy-for, resentment, gloating and pity). 
The cognitive empathic processes are the appraisals of events 
regarding the consequences for the others. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example appraisals from the OCC model of 
emotions [15]. 
The second approach is inspired by a generic model of the human 
psyche [7], [8] (see fig. 2). PSI is a comprehensive and 
motivation-based architecture grounded in general psychology 
research. It allows for modeling psychic processes, integrating 
perception, cognition, emotion, motivation, and action within a 
model of human action regulation. Competing intentions are 
calculated from the current state of five basic needs, with their 
strength being influenced from the success probability derived 
from past experiences and the urgency of fulfilling the need. One 
of PSI’s unique characteristics compared to other models of the 
human mind (e.g. [16] [17]) is the explicit incorporation of an 
emotional model that specifies emotions as modulations of the 
information processing, as inherent emergent property of 
cognition: emotions in PSI are specific characteristic ways in 
which the cognitive system works when faced with specific 
constellations of situational and internal (motivational) 
conditions. 
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Deserved 
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Figure 2: PSI model of the human psyche [7], [8]. 
Thus, emotions serve as quick adaptations of the organism to a 
specific situation. E.g. fear is experienced under conditions that 
produce high need for certainty and competence and – as a result 
– is characterized by a high arousal level (preparedness for quick 
reaction), low resolution level (inaccurate perception and 
planning), and low selection threshold (organism is easily 
distracted by other cues within its environment in an attempt to 
detect dangers in it). It is the model of emotion that is embedded 
in a broad and comprehensive model of action regulation that 
makes the PSI approach particularly interesting when it comes to 
modeling empathy. Due to the “perception” of parameter settings 
in the other agent, a similar emotional state in the empathic 
agent can emerge, taking the pre-empathic state of the empathic 
agent into consideration (affective empathy). Knowledge about 
the internal state of another agent (cognitive empathy) is 
acquired through the model’s learning mechanism.  
The third approach is a simple “if-then” computational approach, 
sparing computing capacity by being based on structures or 
processes that are already implemented or that need 
implementation in any case (see fig. 3). Given that the emotional 
states of the agents can be described by some type of “emotional 
parameters”, the empathic agent adopts the emotional parameters 
of the other agent using an attenuation factor (affective empathy). 
The empathic agent’s emotion resulting from the empathic 
process is a mixture of the two agents’ emotional states. 
Knowledge about the feelings of another agent in a given 
situation (cognitive empathy) is implemented through “if…  
then… ”-relations. The difference to the OCC-model is that this 
approach specifies how information about another person’s 
internal states are stored in and retrieved from memory whereas 
the OCC model describes the actual process of “reasoning” about 
the internal state of another person. 
 
 
Figure 3: Low-level approach to modeling empathy. 
3. MODEL EVALUATION 
3.1 Text-based approach 
It was decided to take a text-based approach to evaluate the 
empathic outcome of the models, i.e. we produced text-based 
outputs for the models in an iterative approach: First, the expert 
answers by Dr. Dr. Rainer Erlinger, an expert to moral dilemmas 
who regularly gives advice to the readers of a weekly German 
magazine [9], were reviewed. Second, we carefully selected four 
questions from readers seeking advice that allowed for the 
emergence of emotions and used them as scenarios for the 
evaluation (cinema, hair stylist, car parking, and antenna). In the 
following, two examples are provided1: 
“I lately went to the cinema, where only few viewers wanted to 
watch the movie. Shortly after the beginning of the film, a man 
sat down on the seat right beside me. I felt upset but didn’t have 
the heart to change the seat because I didn’t want to be rude. In 
the end, I felt angry during the whole movie. Was my behavior 
polite or rather foolish?” (cinema) 
“One year ago, my relationship to my boyfriend ended in a 
terrible way, after I found out that he has been cheating on me for 
years. He now gave me three gift coupons for my incredibly 
expensive hair stylist as a birthday present. Even though I don’t 
have as much money as he does, I didn’t want to benefit from the 
voucher –because I felt too proud to do so. My hair stylist 
deemed me totally crazy, especially because my ex-boyfriend 
already had paid for the vouchers, and convinced me to use them. 
Now my haircut is amazing, but every time that I look in the 
mirror, I can’t feel happy about it. I always ask myself whether I 
am bribable or not. Should I maybe forfeit the remaining 
vouchers?”(hair stylist) 
The two remaining scenarios discuss the potential dangers of a 
radio antenna on a family home and whether the reader should 
mention them to her friend who has recently moved in with her 
children (antenna) and the waiting inside the own car on a public 
car parking in the highly frequented area in front of the main 
station, blocking the parking space for others (car parking). 
Third, two trained psychologists adapted the answers of Dr. Dr. 
Erlinger separately to the model conceptions outlined above. This 
was done by applying the empathy processes and outcomes, as 
specified by the respective models, to the answers the expert 
provided in the newspaper, thus changing them slightly and 
ending up with four “expert” answers for each of the four 
scenarios. The two psychologists then discussed their respective 
solutions and adapted them iteratively until they negotiated a 
common solution for each scenario-model-combination. These 
scenarios served as the pool of relevant model “behavior” for the 
evaluation study.  
To reduce inter-model variance that was not produced by the 
differences between the models but by different use of language 
when adapting the answers, only those words and phrases of the 
original answer by Dr. Dr. Erlinger were changed that were 
directly related to empathic processes or outcomes (e.g. 
speculating on the thoughts and feelings of others, discussing 
emotions, intentions, needs, wishes, etc.); all other phrases and 
passages were kept identical between the adaptations of one 
scenario. This resulted in highly similar adaptations with only 
marginal variance produced by the models which is illustrated by 
the following answer displaying the OCC-inspired version of Dr. 
                                                             
1 Translated into English by the authors. 
Dr. Erlingers answer to the cinema scenario (original expressions 
in brackets): 
“To ostentatiously change seats in a cinema is a bit unfriendly. 
However, there is no need to feel shame as long as the other 
person was unfriendly towards you. [Dr. Dr. Erlinger: „That 
would be justified if the other person was unfriendly towards 
you”]. Was this the case? In fact, the other person just chose a 
seat in which to sit, a right earned by purchasing the ticket. But 
the mere right is not what is at stake here. The problem here is 
one of personal space or interpersonal distance: each person has 
an area around themselves, marked by invisible borders which 
should not be violated by strangers. The classic reference in 
behavioral research is “The Hidden Dimension” by Edward T. 
Hall. Hall introduced the term “proxemics” for the study of 
perceived behavior in space. He distinguished between several 
zones, e.g. intimate zone, personal zone, and public zone. The 
situation in a cinema falls into the personal distance (0.45-1.20 
m) which can be intruded only if both interaction partners want 
to be close or if there is a limited amount of space. Both 
conditions are not true in the present situation. Among the 
functions of personal space that have been discussed recently are: 
keeping control over one’s freedom to act and communicate, 
maintaining a feeling of safety (from threats or distress), and the 
possibility of retreat and recreation. Thus, personal space ensures 
a feeling of contentment which was impaired by your neighbor. 
Despite the apparent tranquility, he acted not just somehow 
strange, but distressed you like a true provocateur transgressing 
your personal boundaries [Dr. Dr. Erlinger: „… as a true 
provocateur attacked you with socially unacceptable behavior”]. 
You do not have to endure this. Faced with such insolence, it 
seems remarkable that you have managed to control yourself. To 
silently change seats is not impolite, but rather noble.” 
Due to the relatively high inter-scenario similarity, three 
decisions were made regarding our evaluation design: 
· We decided to include the original answer provided by 
Dr. Dr. Erlinger as a baseline. 
· We decided against providing each participant of our 
evaluation study with all four scenarios (total workload 
of 16 scenarios: three adaptations plus the original 
answer for each of the four scenarios). 
· Instead, we decided to randomly assign the 3+1 model 
adaptations to the scenarios and include two 
experimental groups with different assignments (see 
table 1). 
Table 1: Scenarios rated by the two experimental groups. 
Scenario group A (N=12) group B (N=14) 
Cinema Dr. Dr. Erlinger OCC-inspired 
approach 
Hair Stylist PSI-inspired 
approach 
Dr. Dr. Erlinger 
Antenna OCC-inspired 
approach 
Low-level 
approach 
Car Parking Low-level 
approach 
PSI-inspired 
approach 
3.2 Sample and Procedure 
26 subjects (21 female, aged 20 – 44 yrs., M = 26 yrs.) were 
asked to imagine themselves in the role of a newspaper editor 
who wants to hire an expert for a moral-dilemma-column such as 
the one in [9]. They were then exposed to four “as-if”-answers to 
given moral dilemmas of applicants to the job that they had to 
rate on a list of adjectives in order to assess their qualification 
for the job. For the ratings, we used a German adaptation of 
Davis, Luce and Kraus’ adjective list [10] to assess empathy; the 
resulting empathy scale’s internal consistency in the present 
study was a= .93. As described above, from the 16 possible 
answers two sets of scenario-model-combination were chosen, of 
which 12 of the subjects rated one, and 14 of the subjects rated 
the other one (see table 1). The cover story, dilemmas, answers, 
and adjective lists were all presented in electronic format. 
3.3 Evaluation Results & Discussion 
The results of the evaluation suggest that the differences between 
the scenarios cause differences in the empathy rating, not the 
underlying model characteristics. A two-way ANOVA yielded a 
significant main effect for scenario (F=43.24; df =3; p=.000), but 
neither a significant main effect for model nor an interaction 
effect. Particularly the answers to the cinema-scenario were rated 
significantly less empathic than the other answers, independent 
of the underlying model (see figure 4). Regarding the differences 
between the models, there are significant differences between the 
low-level model on the one hand which is rated with the highest 
empathy scores and the OCC-inspired model and the original 
answer by Dr. Dr. Erlinger on the other hand which obtain the 
lowest empathy scores (t=2.77; p=.008; t= -3.47; p=.001). 
Obviously, while the design tried to carefully minimize variance 
produced within one scenario through the process of adapting the 
answers to the model approaches (e.g. by using different words, 
phrases, varying length of the answer), the variance produced by 
the differences among the scenarios overruled the subtle 
differences that were caused by the model adaptations. The 
scenarios seem to be differentially prone to evoke empathic 
reactions. While the moral dilemma of the cinema scenario 
discusses the intrusion of personal space in the situational 
context of leisure time, the antenna scenario analyses the dangers 
posed by a radio antenna for mobile phones on the roof of a 
family home in which a friend plans to raise her small children. 
Obviously, the latter scenario provides much more potential for 
emotional involvement than the first. Thus, the results of the 
present study provide valuable insight into which of the scenarios 
is more appropriate for empathy research than the others. 
However, the main research question could not be answered with 
the present design due to the fact that (1) the scenarios produce 
much stronger differences in empathy ratings than the models at 
stake, and (2) there is no complete set of empathy ratings for all 
of the four models within one scenario. Definite conclusions 
about the qualitative difference between the empathic outcome of 
the models thus have to be addressed by more elaborate data 
collection, including more subjects and all three (four) competing 
models within each scenario. In order to reduce the work load for 
the participants (the main reason for the present design), only 
one scenario should be used and adapted to the three different 
models, e.g. “antenna” which seems most appropriate to trigger 
empathy according to the present results. Thus, variance between 
the different scenarios would be controlled for. Furthermore, the 
approach would benefit from a supplementary validation of the 
text-based model implementation, e.g. through setting up a small 
group of trained experts to test whether the empathic “behavior” 
of the models can be reproduced. 
Discussing the (insignificant) differences between the models, 
the low-level model yielded the highest empathy scores. This 
might be due to the relatively simple “if-then”-rules which could 
be easily implemented in the expert answers, providing these 
answers with an easy-to-read structure that was “rewarded” by 
the participants of our study. In contrast, the OCC-inspired 
approach is based on rather complex appraisals resulting in a set 
of numerous qualitatively different emotional states; only few of 
these emotional states were applicable to the present scenarios: 
the complexity of the model was obviously not recognizable for 
the participants of our study, given the limited character of the 
“behavior” they had to rate. Dr. Dr. Erlingers on the other hand, 
who writes the original expert answers in a weekly magazine, 
does not only provide empathy for the reader who sends in the 
dilemma, but also wants to entertain his readers, a motivation 
that might interfere at times with his display of empathy, as 
opposed to a face-to-face situation between e.g. a client and a 
consultant or a therapist. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Empathy scores for models and scenarios. 
 
In sum, the text-based evaluation yields differences in empathic 
outcomes, providing insights in the working mechanisms of 
different theoretical conceptions of empathy. The scenarios 
clearly differ in their empathic potential, contrasting topics from 
leisure time with the safety of a family home. However, taking 
into account the minimal model adaptations made to the answers 
by keeping all non-emotional content of the originals untouched, 
this methodology might be of further use in the forefront of 
programming agents if the model characteristics and differences 
would be implemented more clearly than in the present study. 
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